Wednesday, July 22, 2015

The Kidnapping of Yossele Schumacher – A Domestic Quarrel that Divided Israel in the 1960s

The Yossele Schumacher affair was basically a domestic quarrel that got out of hand. It took two Supreme Court decisions, a nationwide police search and ultimately a joint Mossad-Shin Bet operation to find the kidnapped boy. The affair exposed a rift between religious and secular Jews. The cry "Where is Yossele?"directed in defiance towards ultra-orthodox (Haredi) Jews became a rallying call, if not a battle cry, for the secular Israeli public of the early 60's. The father of this writer remembers vividly seeing a truck full of soldiers in one of the main streets of Jerusalem singing this chant when they saw a Haredi man walking in the street.

Since the affair was initially an internal Israeli one, the vast majority of documents we are publishing here, including police reports, letters from both sides to the president and to Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim, stenograms of government meetings and more, are in Hebrew. See them on our Hebrew blog.

Yosef (Joseph or 'Yossele', an affectionate Yiddish nickname) Schumacher was born in 1952 in the Soviet Union. In 1957, Yossele and his parents, Ida and Alter, came on aliya. Due to economic hardship the parents left Yossele with Ida's father, Nachman Shtarks, who lived in the Haredi Jerusalem neighborhood of Geula.  Shtarks was a former prisoner in the Soviet gulag, where he was tortured for his steadfast religious beliefs. He didn't falter.
After settling down and improving their economic status, the parents asked the grandfather to return their son. The grandfather refused. Shtarks wanted Yossele to learn in a Haredi yeshiva. He believed that his son-in-law (with whom he wasn't on the best of terms) was a communist and wanted to return to the Soviet Union. He claimed that Alter was subjecting his grandson to Shmad – forced conversion to another religion (in this case – to Communist atheism). Shtarks received a Psak Din (a religious verdict) from Jerusalem's chief rabbi, Pesach Zvi Frank, which allowed him to keep his grandson in his custody, in order to prevent him from being forced to leave Judaism. (It later became clear that Rabbi Frank was not in full possession of the facts.)

After filing a complaint with the police, the parents took the case to the Supreme Court of Justice. The Supreme Court issued a Habeas Corpus order on 10/2/1960, ordering the grandfather to return the child to his parents. The grandfather refused. The court issued another order a month later demanding the immediate return of the boy and instructed the police to carry out the order. The grandfather did not comply, basing his objection on Rabbi Frank's Psak Din. In May 1960, the court ordered the arrest and imprisonment of Nachman Shtarks until he complied with the order. The grandfather remained in jail until the end of the affair in autumn 1962.

But what had happened to Yossele?  After the complaint to the police and the first verdict, the boy was taken out of his Yeshiva in Rishon leZion and moved to different locations, including the Haredi village of Kommemiut (in the south of Israel, near Ashqelon) and later the city of Bnei Brak.

New faces entered the fray, such as Neturei Karta (Guardians of the Walls in Aramaic), the extreme anti-Zionist Haredi group, which joined the efforts to hide the boy and invited a Frenchwoman--a convert to Judaism named Ruth ben David--to help them in their efforts to smuggle the child abroad. Ben David (whose original name was Madeleine Ferraille) was a successful Maquis resistance courier during World War II and managed to smuggle Yossele out of Israel as her daughter (here is an article from the Jerusalem Post about her).  Passport control at Lod airport was looking for a boy – not a girl.

Yossele was moved to several European countries – Switzerland, France and Britain. In July 1960, a police report mentioned the possibility that he was in London, from hints in postcards sent by Shtark's son Ovadiah who lived there. In March 1962, the principal of a boarding school in Gateshead, a major center of the Haredi community in England, complained to the Israeli ambassador in London, Arthur Lourie, about a search of the school. Feldman wrote that the local police and representatives of the Haifa police had descended on the school during morning prayers and held all those present for questioning, although there was no evidence that the boy was there.

Meanwhile Yossele was transferred to New York, under the supervision of the Satmar Hasidim, who (like the Neturi Karta) were virulent anti-Zionists. Meanwhile the parents' lawyer, Shlomo Cohen-Zidon, formed a public committee to return Yossele to his parents, and a wide range of public figures were approached to try to end the dispute. 

Due to the Israel Police's failure to find Yossele and rising tensions between religious and secular Israelis, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion ordered the head of the security services, Isser Harel (the overall director of both the Mossad and Shin Beth) to find the boy. Dozens of Mossad agents and volunteers were sent to Jewish communities in Europe, especially Haredi ones. Ruth Ben David's name came up and Harel believed that she could be the key person in the affair. Ben David was lured to a house in France and was held there for weeks, while Mossad agents tried to convince her to tell where Yossele was being held. Ben David refused to cooperate and only when Harel himself arrived and convinced her that it was for the boy's own good, she agreed to tell them the truth. Harel was so impressed that he offered her a job in the Mossad – but she declined.

Yossele was found in Brooklyn, New York in the residence of Rabbi Zanvil Gertner, a Satmar Hassid. He was reunited with his mother in the Israeli consulate in New York.
Following the return of Yossele to Israel, the government decided to stop all legal proceedings against the people involved in the kidnapping, except for Shalom Shtarks, Yossele's uncle, who denied involvement and left Israel to live in Britain. After his involvement was revealed, he was extradited to Israel after a long legal battle (here are the minutes in the House of Lords concerning the extradition of Shtarks), in which he claimed that as a resident of Jerusalem, Israel had no jurisdiction over him (which didn't endear him on to many of Israel's citizens). He was sentenced to 3 years in jail, but received a pardon in 1963. These moves were made to reduce tensions among the Israeli public. 
                                             Here is a part of a newsreel showing the return of Yossele to Israel
   
Yossele Schumacher joined the IDF in 1970 and served as an officer in the artillery corps. He worked in IBM Israel and lives today in Sha'arei Tikva (near Rosh Hayin).

Monday, July 13, 2015

13 July 1953, Creating Facts: The Israeli Foreign Ministry Moves to Jerusalem



In July 1953 the Israeli Foreign Ministry was about to move its offices to Jerusalem. Israel's leaders knew that this was a controversial move, since, on 9  December 1949, the UN General Assembly had passed Resolution 194 on the internationalization of Jerusalem under UN control. In 1947 Israel had accepted internationalization of Jerusalem as part of the Partition Plan. But after the Arabs rejected the plan and tried to prevent its implementation by force, Israel no longer felt bound by it.

On 5 December 1949 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion declared in the Knesset that Jewish Jerusalem was an organic and inseparable part of the State of Israel.  At that time Israel agreed to international supervision of the Holy Places, most of which were in any case under Jordanian rule.  We've already shown here the draft of his statement Ben-Gurion  sent to Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, in which he threatened that Israel would leave the UN if the resolution was adopted.   
After the resolution passed,  despite opposition from Britain and the US, Ben-Gurion announced the transfer of the Knesset and the government ministries to Jerusalem.  Sharett  opposed the announcement and believed that there was no real danger of steps to carry out internationalization. He even threatened to resign  – see his reaction here.


Ben-Gurion, Sharett and Minister Moshe Shapira
 in the first Knesset building
in Jerusalem (Frumin House), 1952
Photograph: Wikimedia
The Knesset and the Prime Minister's Office were transferred to Jerusalem immediately, but other government offices followed gradually. A complex of one storey bungalows in the Givat Ram area of Jerusalem was built to house the Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile Sharett ran the office from the Kirya government buildings in Tel Aviv. In May 1952 the move was announced, to be carried out in the summer of 1953. 

In May 1953 the new US Secretary of State J.F. Dulles visited Israel as part of a tour of the Middle East. He hoped to organize an anti-Soviet defence organization similar to NATO but found little enthusiasm among the Arab states. During the trip he met Sharett, and, according to a letter sent to the secretary in July, the foreign minister told Dulles about the imminent move to Jerusalem, and the secretary did not protest. He asked that the move not take place while he was in the area, and suggested that Sharett repeat previous statements on Israel's attitude to the Holy Places. Sharett gave a statement in the Knesset recognizing Israel's obligations to protect the Christian Holy Places under its control.
Nuns crossing into Jordan at the Mandelbaum Gate
 Photograph: Fritz Cohen, Government Press Office

On his return to the US, Dulles gave a radio speech on his tour. He said that the new Republican Administration should act to allay the fears of the Arabs and to restore the reputation of the US, which they believed was giving one sided support to Israel.  He described his feelings on seeing Jerusalem, which was split into armed camps, but was above all a Holy Place. Dulles, son of a Presbyterian minister, said that the link to Jerusalem felt by religious groups all over the world was a claim preceding the political claims of Israel and Jordan. Headlines in the Israeli press claimed that he had supported the internationalization of the city, the return of some of the Arab refugees and the strengthening of the Arab League.
On June 7 the government discussed the speech. In Sharett's  references to Jerusalem (pp. 5-9) he emphasized that there was no change in US policy. Israel could gain if the Holy Places were put under international control, as it might get access to the Western Wall and to Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem. He warned his colleagues against the illusion that unilateral action by Israel, and faits accomplis such as moving the government offices, could actually solve the problem of Jerusalem.  The rest of the world, and especially the Catholic church, which had much influence in France and Latin America, did not accept Jerusalem as Israel's capital. The unclear situation could be exploited by the Arabs, even though they cared for the Holy Places "as the snows of yesteryear'.  Ben-Gurion also commented on Dulles' speech but his comments centered on other issues.

In the guidelines he sent Israel's diplomatic representatives to explain the coming move, Sharett asked them to emphasize the practical reasons involved. He described at length the difficulties suffered by the Ministry staff, and especially the minister himself, in commuting between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and the harmful effects of their remoteness from the centre of decision making. 

The Foreign Ministry moves in, 9 July 1953.
 Photograph: Yehuda Eisenstark , Israel State Archives
 Sharett knew that the embassies would not leave Tel Aviv but did not expect any particular problem with official visits to the Ministry in Jerusalem. Arab protests were loud, as can be seen below.

 The American reaction was  also harsh, and together with  other Western countries, they announced that they would not conduct any official business in Jerusalem, even if invited by the minister. Sharett wrote to Dulles, arguing that plenty of time had been given to the UN to deal with the Jerusalem issue in a more realistic way, but it had not done so. Before the move the US ambassador and their staff had had no difficulty in visiting government offices in Jerusalem. He added that no change in Jerusalem's status was involved. "New Jerusalem has in any case and to all practical purposes been our capital since 1949, and would have continued to be our capital, with the Foreign Ministry or without it." 

Gradually the ban was relaxed, and on Independence Day, 1954, most of the diplomatic corps attended the president's reception in Jerusalem. 

Most diplomatic representations in Israel remain in the Tel Aviv area, but today all official visits by heads of state are received at the Foreign Ministry . The ministry remained in the hut complex for 50 years, until an impressive new building  was opened in 2003 near the Supreme Court in Givat Ram.  

The Foreign Ministry today
Photographs: The Israeli Association for Diplomacy



Sunday, June 7, 2015

Golda Meir's Political and Personal Struggle After the Yom Kippur War


Many of the posts appearing here are about Golda Meir, Israel's fourth prime minister and the only woman (so far) to head the government. This material comes from a collection of Golda's speeches and letters which will soon be published in a  commemorative volume in the series on Israel's late prime ministers and presidents.  The book will shed new light on her role as prime minister and especially on her leadership during the Yom Kippur war of October 1973.


Cover of a book by journalists published after the war
During the war Golda was acutely conscious of the danger that Israel's military reverses would harm its international standing and its fate in the political struggle which would follow. The prime minister, who was already 75 years old, reacted emotionally to the death of thousands of soldiers.  According to her memoirs she felt guilty that she had not overruled her advisers and insisted on calling up the reserves before war broke out. She wanted to resign, but felt she could not evade her responsibilities, especially the need to discover the fate of the soldiers missing in action and to ensure the return of those held prisoner in Egypt and Syria.

And she could not abandon the political struggle. On March 4 1974, after a stormy party meeting led her to threaten resignation, Foreign Minister Abba Eban wrote to her in typically convoluted style: 
" I understand the depth of the feelings which exploded in you yesterday afternoon, and I have no argument against them. On the other hand I am constantly aware of the international aspects of the problem. The implications are serious and all agree that the events of yesterday indicate a weakening of our position, and especially a weakening of the opportunities which have opened up recently …. which I fear  that the public does not sufficiently appreciate. It seems to me that you deserve – and all of Israel deserves – that your central responsibility in advancing the chances for peace be exerted "

(translated from the Hebrew).

We have already written here about the disengagement of forces agreements signed during the last months of Golda's government, which were indeed the first stage in the process  leading to peace with Egypt.  This month we mark the anniversary of the return of the POWS following the agreement with Syria on 31 May 1974. 
 After the interim report of the Agranat committee left the political leadership untouched, the public demand for the resignation of Defence Minister Moshe Dayan became unbearable. On April 10 1974 Golda resigned, and Dayan had to follow suit. However Golda continued to head a caretaker government until her successor Yitzhak Rabin had formed a new coalition. Meanwhile US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger helped to negotiate Israeli withdrawal from the part of Syria it had captured in October 1973 and from the deserted Syrian town of Kuneitra, which has figured in the fighting in Syria in recent months.  Golda was afraid that any withdrawal beyond the "purple line" of 6 October 1973 would set a dangerous precedent and she had great sympathy for the opposition led by settlers from the Golan kibbutzim whose lands bordered on Kuneitra.

Following the war and the rise in oil prices, Israel's economic situation was desperate. As well as the return of the POWs and ending a war of attrition with Syria, the most important factor in Golda's decision to agree to withdrawal was the need for US military support and economic assistance. On Dayan's initiative, she proposed a long term commitment by the US to accompany the agreement,  ensuring military aid, and a written promise by the president not to demand that Israel to come down from the Golan Heights. On 12 May Golda wrote to Kissinger giving details of Israel's demands. The assurance on the Golan included on a draft of 10 May was left out. She added:

“Mr. Secretary, if I dare put before you, and through you to the President, requests of such dimension, it is because I know that in undertaking the current actions we are assuming grave national risks. We do so because of our firm conviction that these steps are an imperative of the joint course of policy which we both hope will advance the course of peace." 

 President Nixon, already deeply embroiled in the Watergate affair which led to his resignation, was reluctant to give an assurance on the Golan. It was not included in the letters which accompanied the agreement. When Nixon visited Israel in June 1974, Kissinger promised that he would sign the letter on the plane. He didn't. It was finally signed by his successor Gerald Ford in September 1975. But that's a story for another post……
Wounded  Syrian POWs are returned home, 1 June 1974
Photograph: Government Press Office

 

Tuesday, June 2, 2015

British reports on Hassan Salameh, an Arab terrorist leader killed in the War of Independence


Hassan Salameh (indicated by the arrow). Published in the Egyptian magazine "Al Musawar" on 12.1.1948 with the caption "The hero Hassan Salameh; Commander of the Southern front" (Wikipedia)

On June 2, 1948, Hassan Salameh, the commander of a Palestinian military organization in the Lydda and Ramle area, died of his wounds suffered while leading an attack on May 31 against members of the IZL (Irgun Tsvai Leumi or Irgun, the right wing Jewish resistance movement that fought the British Mandate government) who were holding the settlement of Rosh Ha'ayin. Today, 67 years after his death, the Israel State Archives is publishing some documents of the British Criminal Investigation Department (CID) concerning Hassan Salameh (File P 3056/56 in the Archives).

According to the CID documents, Salameh was born in the village of Qula in the Lydda district (not far from the city of Modi'in today) sometime between 1910 and 1912 (the exact year is not clear). From 1937 on, he participated in terror attacks during the Great Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 against British rule. Among his actions was an attack on a train near Ramle on October 14 1937, and he was wounded during the attack. After the failure of the revolt, Salameh escaped from Palestine and arrived in Rome after the beginning of the Second World War, while staying in contact with the leader of the revolt, Hajj Amin al-Husseini (who arrived in Berlin after the failure of the Iraqi pro-Axis insurrection in 1941). On October 1944, German Intelligence parachuted a team of saboteurs composed of German and Arab agents near Jericho, in an operation code named ATLAS. The saboteurs planned, among other missions, to poison the springs in Rosh Ha'ayin, which delivered water to Tel Aviv. Part of the team was caught in a large manhunt conducted by the British security forces (led by the commander of the Jericho police, Faiz Bey al-Idrissi, the highest ranking Arab officer in the Palestine Police) but two managed to run away – Salameh and a German, originally from the German Templar community in Palestine named Deiniger. In the British CID files we find two documents regarding the affair: The first from October 31, 1944 and the second dated November 3, 1944.
 
Three weeks after fighting between Jews and Arabs broke out in Palestine which eventually led to the war of Independence, on December 22 1947, the superintendent of police in the Lydda district was asked by the district commissioner for information on Salameh, described as "one of the two most active trouble-makers in the country at present" (he doesn’t mention who the other "trouble-maker" is). The CID replied on December 30, sending a full brief on Salameh and an attached letter. One of the interesting facts arising from the brief (paragraph 8) is that in 1939, after escaping to Syria, Salameh offered his services to the British whom he had been fighting , but they declined his offer.

Salameh's son, Ali Hassan Salameh (1940-1979) joined the FATAH organization and during the 1970s led the "Black September" organization, which conducted a series of murderous terror attacks against Israel. The most notorious of the operations was the attack and murder of the Israeli sportsmen in the Munich Olympics in September 1972. In January 1979, Ali Hassan Salameh was assassinated in Beirut.

Thursday, May 7, 2015

The End of World War II in Europe: Wartime Letters from Chaim Herzog to Family and Friends



This May we mark the 70th anniversary of the surrender of Nazi Germany and the end of the Second World War in Europe. Last year we published a post on a letter sent in May 1945 by Israel's future president, Lieutenant Chaim (Vivian) Herzog, to his parents, while serving as an intelligence officer in the British army. Here we bring you more of Herzog's wartime letters in English which were collected for the commemorative volume issued by the Archives.
Chaim Herzog and his brother Yaakov
with their father in Germany, June 1946
Israel State Archives
In the summer of 1938 Herzog, born in Belfast when his father, Rabbi Isaac (Yitzhak) Herzog, was serving as chief rabbi of Ireland, went to England to study law. When World War II broke out in 1939 he was not conscripted, but after qualifying as a barrister in 1942 he joined the British Army. You can read the letter he sent to his parents and brother Yaacov here. He signed it "Vivian", the name by which he was known in the Army, as Chaim was hard to pronounce.

In June 1944 the allied armies invaded Normandy. Herzog too was sent to France and searched for members of his family who had managed to survive the Holocaust. He wrote to his parents about a visit to them in Paris in November 1944 and about his attempts to obtain news of his cousin Annette Goldberg, who died in Auschwitz. In December 1944 he took part in the Allied invasion of Germany and in April 1945 he wrote to his parents from Brussels about celebrating – or rather not celebrating – the Pesach holiday in occupied Germany.   Soon afterwards Herzog wrote to his family on "the morning of the first day of peace in Europe" (May 8) after the surrender of the German forces in the Weser-Elbe peninsula.

After the German surrender Herzog joined the British military government, and on 1 January 1946 he wrote to his old friend Yehoshua (Justus) Justman that he had managed to find Justman's relative Ruth, who had survived. In another letter from September 1946 he described celebrating the New Year in the Belsen D.P. camp which had now become the centre of Jewish life in the British occupied zone. He complained that the German style rabbi sent over from England had failed to rise to the occasion - "Rosh Hashanah before Musaph in a shattered community", and gave a dry sermon, adding in Yiddish "A German [Jew] remains a German."
Chaim Herzog and his mother, Rabbanit Sarah Herzog, in Palestine, 1945
Photograph: David Eldan, Government Press Office Collection
 

Chaim Herzog reached the rank of major, and the experience and knowledge acquired during his service helped him when he became the head of intelligence in the new Israeli army in 1948, and served again in the post in 1959-1961.
   

Monday, February 16, 2015

Google at the Israel State Archives

Google is really good at finding stuff on the Internet; as time passes, it gets ever better at finding the precise stuff we're looking for, and also offering us other related stuff we hadn't actually asked for yet but now that you mention it, hey, that's cool!

Now imagine the Israel State Archives, with literally hundreds of millions of pages of documents the public has never seen. Then imagine the ISA intends putting it all online. Having Google-like abilities to search for the precise needle in the haystack that will be what you need would be a cool thing.

Then keep in mind that the ISA really does intend to launch a new website with the first few millions of pages of scanned documents later this year (2015); and that from then on it intends to add additional collections (or fonds, if you prefer the hi-falutin archival terminology) on an ongoing basis.

You begin to see why the ISA might be interested in having in-house capabilities such as  Google knows to offer, focused specifically on our rich website.

Well, it just so happens this isn't science fiction. That yellow box pictured above is essentially the full power of Google, packed into one Yellow Box (so named because it's, well, yellow and a box). And earlier this month it was installed in the ISA system. From its perch there it will soon begin learning about the ISA materials, so as to devise useful search capabilities that will align queries with data in beneficial ways; then, when we go online it will also start observing patterns of how users behave on our website, and this should give us additional ability to offer useful search results.

It's been a while in the coming, but the ISA really is hoping to start offering a true online archives starting later this year.

Wednesday, February 4, 2015

In the Shadow of the Gallows: Maurice Orbach and Israel's Attempt to Save the Egyptian Jews Accused in the Cairo Trial, 1955


This year will mark the 60th anniversary of many dramatic events in Israel's history. 1955 was a crucial year and a turning point in relations with Egypt, Israel's most powerful neighbour. At the Archives we will soon complete a collection of documents on foreign relations for that year, the last volume in our series on Israeli foreign policy up till 1960. Here we will bring you some highlights of this collection.

One of the reasons for the deterioration of relations with Egypt was the "security mishap" in 1954, which also led to a political crisis in Israel, the "Lavon Affair". Israeli military intelligence had set up a spy and sabotage ring of young Egyptian Jews in Cairo and Alexandria. In June 1954 they were activated to attack American and British targets, in the hope of preventing an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal zone, transfer of the Canal to Egypt and military aid from the U.S., in a Western attempt to court Egyptian ruler Colonel Nasser. In July 1954 some bombs were planted but the damage was negligible. After a bomb went off in the pocket of one of the agents, the members of the ring were arrested. The question whether Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon had given the order for the operation later became the centre of a political storm and affected Israeli politics for  years. However at the time the public was told nothing about the true background to the affair. Israel claimed that the Jews involved were innocent and Cairo was planning a show trial.

In the indictment published in October the prosecution asked for the death sentence for all of the 13 accused. Efforts by Israel and world Jewry to prevent severe sentences began immediately and continued until the end of January 1955. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett was deeply worried that if the Jews were executed, public opinion would make his efforts to reduce border tension and to improve relations with Egypt impossible.


A key figure in these efforts was Maurice Orbach, a British Jew and a Labour Member of Parliament, who visited Cairo in November 1954 as the representative of the World Jewish Congress. After briefing by Sharett, Orbach met Nasser, who told him that the matter was in the hands of the public prosecutor, but he would consider a plea for mercy. Nasser also said he wanted peace with Israel, but could not take steps yet because of the internal situation in Egypt, where a plot to assassinate him by the Muslim Brotherhood had been uncovered. Afterwards there were direct contacts in Paris between Israeli and Egyptian emissaries.

The trial by a military court opened on 11 December in Cairo. Orbach met with Nasser again and messages were passed between him and Sharett (see our previous post on Sharett's letter  warning against the effects of a death sentence). Nasser's reply was that he would do everything possible to prevent "inflammatory sentences." He promised to prevent border incidents and agreed to a high level meeting with Israeli representatives. At the end of December Nasser sent another message, saying that Egyptian public opinion was also inflamed, especially in view of the trial and execution of the six Muslim Brothers who had attacked him. In the current state of tension a high level meeting was impossible.


Crowds hail Nasser in Alexandria after the failed assasination attempt, October 1954
Photograph: Wikimedia


At the beginning of January 1955 reports reached Sharett that "things in the Cairo trial were deteriorating" and he wrote to Orbach asking him to return to Cairo immediately. His adviser Gideon Raphael flew to Paris to brief Orbach for his trip. This time Orbach's reception was frosty. His report (the first pages appear here) shows how he gradually came to realize that Nasser was evading him and would not see him until after the trial. It was learned that the Egyptians would not announce the verdict until it was already confirmed by the Revolutionary Council. Nevertheless Sharett did not give up hope and Israel redoubled its efforts to persuade other countries and humanitarian bodies to intervene.


 On 27 January Egypt announced that two of the accused, said to be the ringleaders of the Cairo and Alexandria groups, Dr. Moshe Marzouk and Shmuel Azar, had been sentenced to death. Two others were cleared and the rest received long jail sentences. The Foreign Ministry mobilized the U.S. Jewish community to ask for Eisenhower's intervention. However Sharett wrote in his diary that there was almost no chance of Nasser's pardoning the accused Jews, now that the verdict had been published. He asked himself if Nasser had deliberately deceived Israel, or had made promises he could not keep because of changed circumstances or opposition within the ruling junta. At the Israelis' urging, Orbach and Richard Crossman, another  British politician who had received promises from Nasser, sent him a telegram begging him to reconsider at the last moment.

 Sharett refused to allow public demonstrations in Israel, and insisted that if protests were made, they must be against the sentence, in order not to encourage the belief that the Jews were innocent. Even Prime Minister Nehru of India, which had no diplomatic relations with Israel, agreed to appeal to Nasser. But Nasser replied to Eisenhower that America too executed spies. It seemed that the international outcry only made him more determined to show his independence. On 31 January Marzouk and Azar were hanged. Sharett thanked those who had tried to help in a special meeting of the Knesset:
"The Government of Israel voices its contempt and horror at the heartless rejection by the rulers of Egypt of the urgent representations made to them, a rejection accompanied even, in some cases, by calculated deceit regarding what was intended.”

“At the same time, the government wishes to express its recognition of all who did what they could, by word and deed, to save human lives and prevent the gallows from casting its shadow over relations between peoples in the days to come."


Israeli stamp issued in memory of Moshe Marzouk